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Fault Tree Analysis is a method implemented through the
use of logic symbols, for analyzing either qualitatively or
quantitatively the events that lead to a mission or system
failure. This work examines an Anti-Aircraft Warfare (AAW)
scenario restricted to the defense of an aircraft carrier.
A fault tree of the events that lead to a hit on the carrier
is displayed logically from the top down. Fault tree anal-
ysis when applied to the AAW model is examined with a view










B. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT WARFARE MODEL 12
C . SUMMARY 13
II
.
EVENT TREE CONSTRUCTION 14




C. SUCCESS TREE VERSUS FAULT TREE 16
D IMPLEMENTATION 19
III. FAULT TREE MODEL 21
A. DEFENSE IN DEPTH 21
B. ASSUMPTIONS 2 5
C. THE MODEL (EXPANDED VERSION) 2 7
D HOW TO READ THE MAJOR SUBEVENTS 2 9
1 . FIRST TIER 29
2 . SECOND TIER 30
3 . THIRD TIER 30
4 . FOURTH TIER 32
5 . FIFTH AND SIXTH TIERS 32
IV. THE DETAILED MODEL 3 5
A. SELF DEFENSE (TIER 1) 35
B. SR SAM SHIP DEFENSE (TIER 2) 42
C. LONG RANGE SAM SHIP DEFENSE (TIER 3) 44
5

D. CAP DEFENSE (TIER 4) 44
E. ASCM LAUNCHED FROM STANDOFF RANGE 4 5
F. ASCM LAUNCHED FROM REDUCED RANGE 46
V. USEFULNESS AND CONCLUSIONS 56
A. QUALITATIVE INSTRUCTIONAL TOOL 56
B
.
QUANTITATIVE PREDICTIVE TOOL 58




ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE (ASUW) 6
3 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) 60
APPENDIX A: PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL
SCENARIO 61
LIST OF REFERENCES 64
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 65

LIST OF FIGURES




2 . 3 INITIAL SCENARIO 17
2 . 4 SUCCESS TREE WITH OR GATE APPLIED 18
2 . 5 FAULT TREE WITH AND GATE APPLIED 19
2.6 LOGIC GATES AND OFF PAGE CONNECTORS 2
3 .
1
BLOCK DIAGRAM 2 8
3 . MAJOR SUBEVENTS 31
3 .
3
MAJOR SUBEVENTS 3 3
4 . 1 ASCM PENETRATES SELF DEFENSE SYSTEM 36
4 . FIRE CONTROL SOLUTION GENERATED 3 7
4.3 CARRIER POINT DEFENSE SYSTEM DOES NOT FIRE ....3 9
4 . 4 ASCM OR LR BOMBER NOT ENGAGEABLE 40
4.5 ASCM PENETRATES SR SAM SHIP DEFENSE 41
4.6 ASCM PENETRATES LR SAM SHIP DEFENSE 4 3
4 .
7
ASCM PENETRATES CAP DEFENSE TO INNER
DEFENSE ZONE 46
4 . 8 ASCM EVADES CAP 47
4.9 LR CAP DOES NOT FIRE AT ASCM 48
4.10 LR CAP FIRES AIM AND MISSES ASCM 49
4.11 ASCM FIRED FROM STANDOFF RANGE 50
4 . 12 ASCM FIRED FROM REDUCED RANGE 51
4.13 LR CAP DOES NOT FIRE AT LR BOMBER 52
7

4. 14 LR CAP FIRES AIM AT LR BOMBER 5 3
4.15 MR CAP DOES NOT FIRE AT LR BOMBER 54
4.16 MR CAP FIRES AIM AT LR BOMBER 5 5

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The cooperation and assistance rendered by the staff of
Coirananding Officer, Tactical Training Group Pacific, in the
early stages of the development of the AAW model are sincere-
ly appreciated. Inaccuracies or inconsistencies that may






The application of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to commer-
cial and military systems has been ongoing for several de-
cades. It has been used to one degree or another in industries
such as aerospace, electronics, chemical processing, nuclear
reactor containment, construction and transportation. It
has evolved from a method for the design and diagnosis of
safe systems to one that also has applicability in Reliabil-
ity Engineering. The more general term. Event Tree Analysis,
refers to a method for examining the events that lead to either
mission success or mission failure. The more restrictive
term. Fault Tree Analysis, refers to a failure oriented anal-
ysis. Hence the top event in a fault tree has generally an
event description that depicts mission or system failure.
Most of the events in a fault tree that support and contri-
bute to the top events are undesirable ones and are appro-
priately named faults.
With minor modifications to the conventional symbology
used in current FTA, the objective of this work is to pro-
vide a model of an Anti-Aircraft Warfare (AAW) scenario from
a mission failure (or defensive) point of view.
It should be emphasized that the methodology used in this
paper has the potential for use in other scenarios either
10

operational or non-operational. In the broader sense of Event
Trees, the potential to analyze not only mission failure but
the more positive side, mission success appears to be unlimited
The results can be used as both a quantitative predictive
and a qualitative instructional tool.
The inherent objective in Fault Tree Analysis is to pro-
vide an in depth analysis that is understandable by others.
This requires that the modelor (or analyst) completely spe-
cify the combinations of events occurring in the system, and
how they lead to the top event through a logical use of sym-
bols and graphs.
In FTA one of the quantitative goals is to compute an
overall probability of mission success or failure. Simply
stated, FTA will predict the occurrence of the top event with
a certain probability. The AAW model examined in this work
is not used as a quantitative predictor but instead examines
in a qualitative manner the events that lead to mission failure.
As a qualitative tool FTA provides a method when properly
used, that could lead to the discovery of events or combina-
tions of events that may not have otherwise been recognized
as causes of the event being analyzed. For further discussion
and treatment of the use of Fault Tree Analysis it is suggested
that the reader consult the articles contained in Barlow,





B. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT WARFARE MODEL
The tactical importance of anti-aircraft warfare makes
it a logical choice as a topic for Fault Tree Analysis. In
addition, an abundance of information consistent with cur-
rent tactical thinking on the AAW problem is readily avail-
able and adaptable to FTA. Simply stated, the AAW problem
concerns the destruction of enemy air platforms and airborne
weapons whether launched from surface, sub-surface or air
platforms. The model considered in this work is for the AAW
problem restricted to air platforms that launch missiles
against U.S. naval aircraft carriers and their escorts. The
problem scope now becomes the defense of an aircraft carrier
against long range bombers (LRB's) that launch long range
air-to-surface missiles (ASM's). In order to reduce the pro-
blem to one that is manageable, the normally assumed 360 degree
circle of protection that is required about the carrier now
becomes a smaller sector of undefined size where one-on-one
engagement analysis is performed. This is not an unreasonable
assumption with the state of alertment associated with today's
early warning detection systems and military intelligence
systems. Applying fault tree methodology from the defensive
point of view, the top event corresponds to the aircraft car-
rier being hit by one air-to-surface missile (ASM) launched
from a long range bomber (LRB) at some standoff launch range.
The aircraft carrier is protected in the sector by airborne
early warning aircraft, long range combat air patrol aircraft
12

(CAP) and medium range CAP, a long range surface-to-air mis-
sile (SAM) ship, a short range SAM ship and the carrier's
own self defense system (commonly called point defense sys-
tem) . By convention the model is developed "top down" through
the contributory events that build to a hit on the carrier.
During application however, the flow of occurrences through
the logic gates is directed upward.
C. SUMMARY
In summary, this paper examines a modified version of
Fault Tree Analysis applied to an Anti-Aircraft Warfare sce-
nario. The features of event tree analysis are examined with
a look toward both quantitative and qualitative application.
Finally an examination of how this methodology may be used
in other operational or non-operational scenarios is conducted
13

II. EVENT TREE CONSTRUCTION
A. EVENT SYMBOLOGY
The top event in a fault tree is generally some undesired
system state resulting from a combination of undesired sub-
system states. Since the tree is developed top down, the
top event must be carefully and thoughtfully defined and then
the tree developed by modelers or analysts who have a fairly
detailed understanding of the system and who can translate
that knowledge into a graphical representation.
The methodology for Fault Tree Analysis that has been
adopted in this paper is a simplification of the standard
methodology found in current works on Fault Tree Analysis.
Specifically, the symbology used in Barlow and Lambert, [Ref.
3], and Young [Ref. 4], has been modified for the convenience
of using computer generated graphics to display the AAW model.
The EVENT symbology used in this work does not alter the logic
or the event sequence associated with the symbology cited
in the references. Although it replaces the use of the four
event symbols in Figure 2.1 by a single symbol, the rectangle,
used to display all events in the model, no information is
lost in this representation. Within the rectangle an undesired
system state is defined. Whether or not it is classified
as a primary event, a secondary event, an undeveloped event














BASIC EVENT SECONDARY EVENT
SWITCH
EVENT
Figure 2 . 1 FTA SYMBOLOGY
B. LOGIC SYMBOLOGY
The two most often used symbols to connect the contri-
butory events to the top event are the two logic gates, the
AND gate and the OR gate. In a mathematical sense the AND
gate represents set intersection while the OR gate represents
set union. In Figure 2.2 undesired Event One will result
only if Event Two and Event Three and Event Four occur. Event
One is the result of transmitting Events Two, Three and Four
through the AND gate. To illustrate the use of the OR gate,
undesired Event Five will result if at least one of the events.
Six, Seven or Eight occur. By transmitting Events Six, Seven
and Eight through the OR gate. Event Five will result. The
tree is structured so that all events lead sequentially and
The symboloqy used here follows closely the symbology
used in current work with the exception that some modelers




logically to the top event, and all are related to the top




















Figure 2.2 LOGIC SYMBOLOGY
C. SUCCESS TREE VERSUS FAULT TREE
The term "success tree" to which prior reference has not
been made is another application of event tree analysis that
can result in a better understanding of the system being anal-
yzed. To contrast the use of success trees and fault trees,
consider the Initial Scenario proposed in the illustration
below. The illustration forms the basis for the AAW model
examined later.
The Initial Scenario can be stated as follows: The carrier
is attacked by a single aircraft. The aircraft attempts to
close to a range which permits the launch of its one air-
to-surface missile. The Initial Scenario is displayed in
Figure 2.3.
From a defensive point of view the modeler could apply
either of the two methods, Fault Tree Analysis or Success
16

Tree Analysis to logically symbolize the events that lead
to the top event. His choice may be purely one of prefer-
ence or there may be underlying assumptions that would cause
him to choose one method over the other. To illustrate the
dual relationship that exists between the two trees, consider
the events that are displayed in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. These






Figure 2 . 3 INITIAL SCENARIO
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Figure 2.4 shows a success tree, with application of the
OR gate. It relates a top event which is favorable to the
defense to the contributing favorable events.
Figure 2.5 shows a fault tree, with application of the
AND gate. It relates a top event which is unfavorable to
the defense to contributing unfavorable events.
In addition to providing graphic representation of suc-
cess tree versus fault tree methodology, the "dual analysis"
displayed in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the simple manner
in which the OR gate and the AND gate can be used interchange-
ably by negating the top event (or any fault/success event)
.
CARRIER NOT HIT
RAID DOES NOT PENETRATE:
ATTACKING AIRCRATT
DOES NOT PENETRATE TO
ASM LAUNCH RANGE
MISSILE DOES NOT HiTt
SOME FAILURE OF THE ASM
Figure 2.4 SUCCESS TREE WITH OR GATE APPLIED
18

The Initial Scenario and the contributing examples are
extracted from unpublished notes by J.D. Esary, Professor
of Operations Research and Statistics, Naval Postgraduate
School. The probability analysis of Appendix A is extracted





MISSILE FlflED A« HITS:
ASM IS LAUNOCO. POCTRATES
ANTIMISSILE OErEMSES. FD«S
TMC CA«RIER, AK) HITS TAHCET
Figure 2.5 FAULT TREE WITH AND GATE APPLIED
D. IMPLEMENTATION
The model examined in this work uses Fault Tree meth-
odology while using the symbology similar to that indicated
in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. The most notable difference is that
both the AND and OR gates are represented by one shape and
that shape is rotated 180 degrees from those of Figures 2.4
19

and 2.5. This shape will become familiar in the next chapter
Since the model is too large to fit on one sheet of standard
size paper, "off page" connectors are used to continue the
model on subsequent pages. The off page connector, a small
circle with the connector page number located inside, is eas-
ily located on each page of the model. Logic gates and off




LOGIC GATES OFF PAGE CONNECTORS
Figure 2.6 LOGIC GATES AND OFF PAGE CONNECTORS
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III. FAULT TREE MODEL
A. DEFENSE IN DEPTH
Although the objective of this work is not to examine
the tactics used by a modern naval combatant task force against
a long range bomber/antiship missile threat, an under-
standing of the defensive concepts used in such a scenario
will assist in the understanding of the model.
The air defense of the U.S. naval battle group is cen-
tered on the aircraft carrier and is based on the aggregate
support from all of the elements in the group. This concept
is called defense- in depth. Three zones of defense are used
to describe defense in depth. Various weapons systems are
employed at different ranges to prevent the penetration of
enemy platforms (Long Range Bombers or ASCM's). The defensive
barriers that are implied here are created by long range and
medium range CAP aircraft in the Outer Defense Zone; by long
range and short range SAM ships in the Inner (or Area) Defense
Zone; and by the individual ships point defense systems in
the Self Defense Zone. The geographical boundaries to each
zone have been generally defined and are based on the maximum
ranges of the various weapons systems. With modern weapons
systems the ranges become somewhat flexible and in many cases
overlap. This is especially evident when one considers the
maximum range of the air intercept missiles (AIM's) used by
fighter aircraft versus the range of the LR SAM.
21

The problem with overlapping weapons coverage is truly
a dynamic one that results in subsequent weapons allocation
problems. When one considers the speed of the incoming ASCM,
this problem becomes even more evident. Once the ASCM is
detected, very little time remains to decide on the best meth-
od to counter the penetrator. This problem exists not only
in the inter zone sense (CAP vs LR SAM for example) but also
in the intra zone sense (which CAP or LR SAM platform to as-
sign)
. For the AAW scenario the task of assigning weapons
to ASCM (or LRB) is the responsibility of the ANTI-AIR WAR-
FARE COMMANDER. The problem becomes more severe when electronic
warfare measures are employed by both the offensive and defen-
sive platforms to degrade the opponent's use of electromagnetic
radiation.
Outer Air Defense Zone tactics are designed to allow outer
air defense forces to detect and destroy antishin cruise
missile (ASCM) platforms (LRB's) before the launch of the
ASCM. Accompanying the long range bombers are electronic
jamming aircraft, commonly called STRIKE SUPPORT aircraft,
that provide electronic support and protection of the LRB's
at STANDOFF ranges. Outer defense zone tactics further in-
clude the destruction of these platforms. The scenario modeled
in this work does not explicitly include the attempt to knock
down these platforms, however the jamming provided by the
strike support aircraft is modeled.
22

Since the primary objective of the LRB is to target the
carrier and subsequently launch an ASCM, the advantageous
position from which to do this is at the maximum range from
the task force. The LRB thereby reduces time in which he
is exposed to the task force CAP aircraft. This range gen-
erally corresponds to the maximum range of the ASM and is
termed the STANDOFF launch range.
The LRB uses active radar to accomplish this task, an
active radar that may be vulnerable to electronic counter-
measures by members of the battle group. The term that is
applied to the use of electronic countermeasures by the bat-
tle force is COUNTERTARGETING. As the term implies, COUNTER-
TARGETING is the use of active or passive jamming to reduce
the range at which the long range bomber can accurately de-
tect and target the aircraft carrier.
What we have seen in the Outer Air Battle is a reduction
in the number of standoff jammers with the use of CAP air-
craft. The attrition of standoff jammers is essential to
the defense of the carrier if the battle group radars are
expected to detect ASM platforms before cruise missile launch
Outer air battle forces thus reduce the number of attackers
that penetrate to the Inner Defense Zone. Finally, the outer
air forces are used to destroy loitering or retiring long
range bombers so that follow-on raids are less severe.
Before proceeding, it may be advisable to consider the
tradeoffs that exist in the Outer Air Battle when offensive
2 3

and defensive electronic countermeasures are employed. The
offensive LRB prefers to target the carrier at maximum stand-
off range in order to launch the ASM (which needs no further
guidance from the bomber once launched) . The LRB thus re-
duces his exposure to the layered defensive forces. The trade-
off here stems from the fact that at maximum standoff range
the targeting problem is more severe than at reduced ranges
where targeting solutions are more accurate. Thus the effec-
tiveness of his attack is reduced. Conversely the defensive
forces, or battle group, use electronic means to increase
the targeting problem and thereby force the bombers to pro-
ceed to ranges more precarious to their survival. More im-
portantly, the probability that an ASCM is launched is reduced.
In the Area Defense Zone long range and short range sur-
face-to-air missiles are employed to destroy penetrating ASCM's
Electronic countermeasures are used to deceive the ASCM's.
Depending on the effectiveness of the countertargeting, an
additional problem of command and control exists with over-
lapping engagement zones. CAP-SAM coordination is necessary
to prevent engagement of defender-on-defender . The coordi-
nation of inner defense weapons is necessary to prevent over-
engagement of one target while others remain unengaged. Thus
real-time management of weapon resources is mandatory in the
hostile environment created by the launch of an ASCM.
The Self Defense Zone constitutes the final barrier in
the defense of the carrier. This zone employs point defense
24

systems (missiles or guns) that have high kill probabilities
to destroy the ASCM's that have penetrated the outer zones.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
The AAW model examined in this work uses the defense in
depth concept to describe the events that lead to a hit on
the carrier. Prior to the assembly and description of the
fault tree, it may prove useful to describe the tactical and
strategic assumptions that were used to design the model.
The assumptions are:
• Carrier battle group is attacked by long range
bombers in open ocean transit.
• Antiship cruise missile is autonomous after
launch; no midcourse update or corrections are
necessary from the mother aircraft.
• Antiship cruise missile flight profile is high
altitude in the cruise phase and steep angle of
attack in the dive phase.
• All defensive forces are modern platforms that
are equipped with the latest variant of Navy
Tactical Data System (NTDS)
.
• Outer air battle forces are comprised of Early
Warning (AEW) and fighter aircraft using vector
logic techniques for detection, tracking and
engagement of hostile platforms.
25

• Although there may be many LRB ' s in the raid
that attack the carrier, this analysis deals
with only one small sector close to the threat
axis
.
• Each LRB has only one ASCM.
• Salvo doctrine for the defensive forces is im-
plicit and imbedded in the fault tree; i.e., how
many missiles it takes to hit the ASCM is not
important, just that the event did or did not
happen.
• Approximate threat axis is known.
• Area defensive forces are NTDS equipped.
• Long range missile ship employs Terrier missile
system to intercept the ASCM.
• Short range missile ship employs Tartar mis-
sile system to intercept the ASCM.
• LR SAM ship is positioned for cruise phase inter-
cept of the ASCM.
• SR SAM ship is positioned for dive phase inter-
cept of the ASCM.
• LR and SR SAM ships have electronic warfare suites
permitting countertargeting techniques.
• Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) doctrine is used.
• Countertargeting, when effective, is only effective
in the Outer Defense Zone.
26

• Some probability exists for a LR/MR CAP to
intercept the high altitude ASCM with CAP-fired
air intercept missiles (AIM's).
C. THE MODEL (EXPANDED VERSION)
Since the model was developed top down to conform to the
convention in Fault Tree Analysis, the top event is assigned
"Carrier is hit" . As previously discussed it is the major
event to which all subevents subscribe. To get an overview
of the events that must be further developed the following
analysis is provided.
The event "CARRIER IS HIT" is a result of:
• Missile penetrates point defense systems.
• Missile penetrates short range SAM ship defense.
• Missile penetrates long range SAM ship defense.
• Missile penetrates LR/MR CAP defenses.
• Missile launched from long range bomber.
• Countertargeting is effective, LR bomber penetrates
LR/MR CAP defenses to reduced launch range.
OR
Countertargeting is ineffective; LRB penetrates
LR/MR CAP defenses to standoff launch range.
The events listed above are the major subsections of the
model. Figure 3.1 displays these major events by block dia-
gram. Developing the sub events that appear in Figure 3.1








































LM CAP LRt evcdn CAPd»f«n—
Figure 3 . 1 BLOCK DIAGRAM
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D. HOW TO READ THE MAJOR SUBEVENTS
The block diagram presented in Figure 3.1 was used as
a starting point to gain an overall appreciation for the model
An expanded version of the model with fault tree symbology
applied is presented in Figure 3.2 and continued in Figure
3.3. The model was developed from the block diagram using
a "tiered" approach. Each tier represents a combination of
subevents that are linked together with logic gates. Each
tier is in actuality composed of many subevents but only the
major events are displayed in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The num-
bers that appear in parentheses adjacent to each block (or
group of blocks) in Figure 3.1 correspond to the tiers in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The tiers are correspondingly numbered
also. The tiers represent specific levels of defense through
which the ASCM must penetrate.
Applying this nomenclature and using the Defense in Depth
concept, block (1) in Figure 3.1 relates to the Self Defense
Zone. This corresponds to tier (1) in Figure 3.1. Similarly,
blocks (tiers) (2) and (3) represent the Area Defense Zone
and blocks (tiers) (4) through (6) relate to the Outer Defense
Zone
.
1 . First Tier
The Self Defense Zone of the carrier is developed
from the primary fault event of the tree or the top event.
The event "Carrier is hit" results from two events that com-
prise the first tier of the model. The ASCM must first
29

penetrate the POINT DEFENSE system of the carrier and the
ASCM must function properly in the terminal (homing) de-
scent phase.
It should be noted that the model presented here is
a one sided model, because the events displayed represent
only the faults of the defensive force (the battle group)
.
With few exceptions, the faults (or successes) of the offen-
sive force are not presented. One instance that is contrary
to this convention occurs in the first tier. The event "ASCM
systems function properly" is a major offensive force event.
2. Second Tier
ASCM penetration of the carrier SELF DEFENSE ZONE
is a result of two major subevents: (a) the missile has pen-
etrated the SR SAM ship DEFENSE ZONE and (b) the missile has
evaded the carrier's Point Defense Zone. Event (b) does not
appear in Figure 3.2. It is the implicit combination of two
events that are connected through a logic gate. The evasion
of the carrier's point defense system is a result of the union
of two events: either (bl) carrier fires it's point defense
system at the ASCM and misses or (b2) the carrier does not
fire.
3. Third Tier
Tier (3) represents the final tier in the Inner Defense
Zone. The penetration of the ASCM through the SR SAM ship
defense is a result of transmitting the event "ASCM penetrates
through LR SAM ship defense" and ASCM evasion of the SR SAM
30
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Figure 3.2 MAJOR SUBEVENTS
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ship defense through an AND gate. ASCM evasion of the SR
SAM ship defense is not an explicit event in Figure 3.2 but
a combination of two events that are connected by an OR gate:
either (a) the SR SAM ship fires and misses or (b) the SR




The penetration of the ASCM through the LR SAM ship
defense is a result of ASCM penetration through the CAP de-
fenses and the intersection of ASCM evasion of LR SAM ship
defense indicated in Figure 3.3. The latter event is a com-
bination of two events: (a) LR SAM ship fires a LR SAM and
misses or (b) LR SAM ship does not fire. These events are
transmitted through an OR gate.
5. Fifth and Sixth Tiers
ASCM penetration to the Inner Defense Zone is a re-
sult of many fault events in the Outer Air War. To put it
into perspective, return to Figure 3.1. The ASCM is launched
from a long range bomber at a position within the maximum
range of the ASCM after the mother aircraft has gained accu-
rate targeting information on the carrier. Depending on the
effectiveness of the countertargeting efforts of the battle
force, the ASCM will be launched either from a STANDOFF launch
range or from a REDUCED launch range
.
Return now to Figure 3.3. At tier (4), ASCM pene-
tration through the CAP defenses is a result of connecting
























































Figure 3.3 MAJOR SUBEVENTS
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launch range" with the essential event of tier (6) "ASCM is
launched from STANDOFF launch range". These tiers are con-
nected by an OR gate. Tiers (5) and (6) are further devel-
oped in Figure 3.3. Referring to tier (5), once launched,
the ASCM must evade the CAP-fired AIM'S. The two events (a)
"ASCM is launched from a REDUCED launch range" and (b) "ASCM
evades LR/MR CAP defense" are connected by an AND gate. The
ASCM is launched from REDUCED launch range because the events
"COUNTERTARGETING ..." and "LR bomber evades LR/MR CAP defenses"
are transmitted through an AND gate.
A parallel analysis can be seen in tier (6) for the
ASCM launched at STANDOFF range.
34

IV. THE DETAILED MODEL
Chapter III presented the AAW model in an expanded ver-
sion. A tiered approach was developed to gain an apprecia-
tion for the construction of the model. The intention in
the present chapter is to detail the model.
A. SELF DEFENSE (TIER 1)
The fault events that contribute to the penetration of
the ASCM through the self defense system of the carrier are
displayed in Figure 4.1. The primary difference between the
events of Figure 4.1 and those of Figure 3.2 is the expansion
of the major subevent in Figure 3.2: "Carrier fires ... and
misses". Three events connected by an AND gate describe this
event. Consider the first event (reading left to right).
In order to fire the ASCM there must be a fire control solu-
tion generated on the carrier. Once the solution is found
by the fire control system (block 2), the carrier fires at
the ASCM and misses.
The events that lead to a fire control solution are pre-
sented in Figure 4.2. The events are connected to Figure
4.2 by the "fcs" off page connector. Events similar to those
of Figure 4.2 are used throughout this work since a fire con-
trol solution must be performed prior to firing any weapon.
Conceptually there is little difference in generating a fire
35












Figure 4 . 1 ASCM PENETRATES SELF DEFENSE SYSTEM
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control solution whether on the carrier or on another NTDS
equipped vessel. Furthermore, although the details of this
analysis imply NTDS, the development is general enough to




























Figure 4.2 FIRE CONTROL SOLUTION GENERATED
The blocks enclosed by the dashed line in Figure 4.2 are
read as follows: a target has been designated "hostile" by
some other unit (AEW, LR SAM SHIP, CAP) ; the target is de-
tected by the carrier's radar and and the symbol that appears
on the NTDS console (visual display) matches the hostile
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designation. A fire control system (there may be more than
one) on the carrier is designated to perform the task of firing
the weapon at the ASCM. The fire control system "acquires"
the target and then "tracks" the target. Finally, a "solution"
to the intercept problem (Point Defense versus ASCM) is com-
puted. All of the events that are enclosed by the dashed
line must happen in order to close the loop, therefore the
events are connected by an AND gate.
Detection of the target with a ship's own radar is con-
strained by the electronic measures taken by the STRIKE SUPPORT
aircraft. In order to detect the target, either "No ECM is
conducted ..." or "ECM is conducted ...". If the latter is
the case then ECM is countered by the self defense system.
These events are displayed in Figure 4.2.
The event "carrier point defense system does not fire"
in Figure 4.1 is supported (via the "cpds" connector) by events
displayed in Figure 4.3. The system does not fire for one
of several reasons: either (1) the "Fire control (FC) solu-
tion is not generated" or (2) the "FC solution is generated
but a command and control problem prevents firing" or (3)
the "fire control solution is generated and the launcher
malfunctions"
.
The FC solution events in Figure 4»3 are supported by the
events displayed in Figure 4.4. The hostile target is
not engageable because (a) either the target is out of the
























Figure 4 . 3 CARRIER POINT DEFENSE SYSTEM DOES NOT FIRE
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this case since the ASCM's goal is to hit the carrier) or
(b) the detection of the ASCM is gained late or (c) the
detection of the ASCM is not made.
To amplify the meaning of the off page connectors, the
following conventions apply. The acronym "fcs" represents
"fire control solution", "cpds" represents "carrier point
defense system" and "nel" translates to "not engageable".
Lower case connectors move "down" the page and connect to
minor subevents while upper case connectors generally move
"across" the page and connect to major events or tiers. This
convention is relaxed in Figure 4.7 where the connectors T5






























































Figure 4.5 ASCM PENETRATES SR SAM SHIP DEFENSE
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B. SR SAM SHIP DEFENSE (TIER 2)
SR SAM ship defense system events are connected to Fig-
ure 4 . 1 by the "T2" connector. They are shown in Figure 4.5.
Penetration of the ASCM through the SR SAM ship defense is
similar in concept to the first tier. In general, a target
(ASCM) must be present that has penetrated a previous tier
and a fire control solution must be generated. The defensive
platform can either fire or not fire at the ASCM, depending
on the circumstances. One notable difference concerns the
four events enclosed by the dashed line. It relates to the
position of the ship. Since the ASCM is targeted for the
carrier, ship positioning in the case of a SR SAM ship be-
comes an issue.
The four blocks represent the major subevent "SR SAM ship
fires SAM at ASCM and misses". The events are connected by
an AND gate. Thus all events must occur in order to have
a firing. The first event, "FC solution ..." is supported
by the contributory events listed in Figure 4.2.
The second and third events (reading from left to right)
appear to be similar structurally and semantically but are
separated to emphasize the issue. Although one of the events
places the SR SAM ship in the approximate location, in range
and on the AAW axis for firing the SAM, the event is included
as a necessary ingredient to the problem solution. If not
positioned optimally, the probability of hitting the ASCM























































Figure 4.6 ASCM PENETRATES LR SAM SHIP DEFENSE
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the SAM launch is important. Consequently the event "ASCM
within launch window of SR SAM ship" is included in this
analysis.
The fourth event enclosed in the dashed box in Figure
4.5, "SR SAM ship fires SAM at ASCM and misses" is self ex-
planatory. The remaining fault events displayed in this por-
tion of the model are similar to those of the previous tier.
Figure 4.1.
C. LONG RA]MGE SAM SHIP DEFENSE (TIER 3)
Long range SAM ship defense is shown in Figure 4.6 and
connected to the SR SAM ship defense tier by the T3 connector.
The entire complex of events is nearly identical to that for
the SR SAM ship system. The problems associated with pre-
venting further penetration of the ASCM are similar in either
case, however the fire control solutions are somewhat differ-
ent. Intercepting the ASCM in its cruise phase represents
a problem that is difficult to solve. Further analysis of
the cruise phase intercept is outside the scope of this work.
D. CAP DEFENSE (TIER 4)
Although the use of CAP aircraft to prevent penetration
of an ASCM after launch is arguable from a practical stand-
point, the event is included in the analysis because it re-
presents a low probability extreme. To omit it from the model
would be inappropriate. It is connected to the events of
Tier 3 (LR SAM Ship Defense) by the "T4" connector. For the
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ASCM to penetrate through the CAP defenses it must initially
have been launched by the LR Bomber at either a STANDOFF range
or a REDUCED standoff range. These events are shown in Figure
4.7. Once launched, it proceeds to high altitude through
the interceptors defense. ASCM evasion of the CAP defenses
is shown in Figure 4.8. It is joined to Figure 4 . 7 by the
"asm" connector.
Figure 4.8 is symmetrical, LR CAP and MR CAP have similar
supporting events, however only the subevents associated with
the MR CAP are shown. The connectors "Ircl" and "lrc2" (re-
ferring to LR CAP) are used to expand the events that lead
to "LR CAP does not fire" shown in Figure 4.9 or to "LR CAP
fires AIM at ASCM and misses" shown in Figure 4.10.
E. ASCM LAUNCHED FROM STANDOFF RANGE
Consider the case where the long range bomber has target-
ing information that will allow launching the ASCM from near
maximum range. Figure 4.11 displays the contributing events
that lead to ASCM launch at long range. Countertargeting
by the battle force has been ineffective and the LR bomber
proceeds to launch range while updating the targeting infor-
mation. The ASCM is then launched and flies to its preassigned
destination (carrier) autonomously. The details of the LR
bomber evading the LR CAP are imbedded in Figure 4.11. It
should be noted that the connectors "fcs" and "nel" support


























Figure 4.7 ASCM PENETRATES CAP DEFENSE TO INNER DEFENSE ZONE
F. ASCM LAUNCHED FROM REDUCED RANGE
This section deals primarily with the countertargeting
problem encountered by the hostile force. As previously pos-
tulated, it is the intention of the LR bomber to launch the
missile at maximum range consistent with the quality of the
targeting solution and the bomber's exposure to battle force
interceptors. The events contributing to ASCM launch at REDUCED
range are displayed in Figure 4.12. This figure integrates
"degrees" of countertargeting into the problem. Countertar-







LA CAP dBM not
ftr« at ASCM
Lft CAP ffres
AIM at ASCM and




































ftra AIM at ASCM
Figure 4 . 8 ASCM EVADES CAP
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Figure 4.9 LR CAP DOES NOT FIRE AT ASCM
toward the carrier until either the LR bomber gains accurate
targeting data (and launches) or the LR bomber encounters
resistance with the outer air battle interceptors. Targeting
range is not well defined in any case thus the supporting
events to "ASCM launch at REDUCED range" are somewhat flex-
ible. The connectors "lrc3" and "lrc4" join the subevents
that relate to the firing or nonfiring of AIM's at the LR
bomber. Similarly, "mrcl" and "mrc2" refer to medium range
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Figure 4.10 LR CAP FIRES AIM AND MISSES ASCM
launched AIM's. The events that detail CAP launched missile
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FiQure 4.16 MR CAP FIRES AIM AT LR BOMBER
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V. USEFULNESS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. QUALITATIVE INSTRUCTIONAL TOOL
At the outset of this work a discussion was initiated
on the use of Fault Analysis as a quantitative predictor and
a qualitative instructional tool. To illustrate these con-
cepts an AAW scenario was introduced and fault tree analysis
was applied to the model.
The model was qualitatively developed using fault tree
methodology to describe the flow of logic that is necessary
to lead to mission failure. The mission in this case was
to defend a carrier against ASM attack.
The model is simple enough to use as an instructional
device for primary students in naval warfare. It is robust
enough to use as a diagnostic tool when analyzing the tactics
that prevent the occurrence of the top event.
The flow chart style of annotation in FTA is compatible
with naval warfare scenarios. One of the features of a flow
chart presentation is to enable a student client to gain an
appreciation for the "big picture". By viewing the AAW sce-
nario from the big picture vantage point it enables the oper-
ator at the radar scope level to better understand the objective




At the warfare commander level, the client is better able
to identify critical combinations of successes (or failures)
that can lead to a more efficient allocation of personnel and
hardward in either a training or operational environment.
As a visual tool, it can be used for communicating results
and supporting decisions that might otherwise seem ambiguous.
This AAW model has identified the "big picture" events that
lead to a hit on the carrier. The model admits detailed analysis
of the events that enter throughout the model, for example, the
event "Command and control problem prevents firing AIM (LR or SR
SAM) at ASCM" . The "command and control problem" at any stage
is one of the more important inhibitors of efficient operations
in naval warfare. It is also one of the most difficult to solve.
Developing the failure event labeled "Command and control ..."
may uncover a solution to the problem not before realized. In
addition, a problem not initially recognized as a problem may
emerge and coincidentally be solved. Just recognizing the pro-
blem and being able to define it sometimes leads to a solution.
Many events throughout the model are undeveloped. One
of the features of FTA is that the model is developed top
down. Undeveloped events can then be expanded by specialists
using relevant experience and technical knowledge. For ex-
ample, the event in Figure 4.2 "Fire control solution is gen-
erated to hit the hostile target" is such an event.
Little emphasis has been placed in the model on the elec-
tronic measures conducted by the hostile platform to prevent
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detection and destruction before launch of the ASCM. In real-
ity this area receives considerable attention and it is of
major importance to both sides. It is an event to which con-
siderable thought and research has been devoted. A specialist
in electronic warfare could develop the concepts (events)
and provide further insight into the problem.
Finally, by considering the "dual" of the fault tree or
the success tree, event tree analysis can be a corroborative
aid in operational planning. By developing the events that
lead to the event "Carrier is not hit" (the complement of
the model's top event) the warfare commander may encounter
an aspect of the problem not previously viewed.
B. QUANTITATIVE PREDICTIVE TOOL
The objective of this work was to examine event tree
analysis, and more specifically Fault Tree Analysis, when
applied to an AAW scenario. The scenario was developed qual-
itatively. The quantitative aspects of the analysis were
not examined. The purpose of this section is to mention the
quantitative possibilities in the FTA approach.
Many models have been developed in AAW that use gaming
and simulation methodology. Many of these models are used
in the instructional environment to enhance a student's tac-
tical ability to use and understand modern platforms and wea-
pons. Imbedded in the games are probabilities (based on assumed
distributions) of specific events occurring with the end result
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(in this case) that the "Carrier is hit" or the "Carrier is
not hit" depending on the tactic used and the final implicit
probability.
Proposed from this model is not so much the stochastic
result, e.g., "with .05 probability, the carrier is hit" but
in a broader sense the sensitivity of that result to various
inputs or events. The model as presented is in some respects
not usable for such an analysis. Given further embellishment
however, it could be a useful tool in sensitivity studies.
To help with the problem of where to place additional emphasis
to reduce the probabilities associated with the end or inter-
mediate results is certainly an inducement to use it in oper-
ational planning.
The issue here is in attempting to assign probabilities
that are clearly subjective arguments on the stare of the
system. Many assumptions must be made to accomplish these
assignments, including a problematic one about the indepen-
dence of events. This would have to be done cautiously in
order to preserve the usefulness of the sensitivity study.
An example of how the Initial Scenario proposed in Chapter
II, and described graphically in Figure 3.2 might be quanti-
fied is given in APPENDIX A. A more detailed analysis is




Other scenarios, analagous to AAW are aptly described
by a fault tree or a success tree. Suppose similar scenarios
were developed using the same degree of detail that was used
in the AAW model. By exposing these trees to the critique
of students and warfare commanders, the level of communica-
tion and understanding at all echelons could be increased.
Below are listed other warfare environments and scenarios
that are amenable to analysis using event trees.
1. AAW
• Submarine launched cruise missiles targeted for
the carrier.




2. Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW)




• Submarine versus submarine engagements.
• Submarine versus surface ship engagement.
• Surface ship versus submarine engagement.




PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL SCENARIO
A typical probability analysis of the Initial Scenario
would proceed along the lines as follows:
P = P (Carrier is hit)
= P (Raid penetrates, missile is fired and hits)






= P (Missile is fired and hits/Raid penetrates)
is the conditional probability that the
missile succeeds once it is within range
P = P(Raid penetrates
K.
is the probability that the missile can
be brought within range
The fault tree for the Initial Scenario expresses the
event H = (Carrier is hit) as the logical "and" of the event
R = (Raid penetrates) and M = (Missile is fired and hits)
.
The event H is the consequence of transmitting the events
R and M through the "and" gate. In the same vein, the pro-
bability P„ can be viewed as the result of transmitting the
n




P„ = P„ A P,, = P„ X P,,





is the probabilistic "and"
of the probabilities P, and P„
The success tree for the Initial Scenario relates the
events H = (Carrier is not hit) to the events R = (Raid does
not penetrate) and M = (Missile does not hit). The events
H, R, M are the logical opposites of the events H, R and M.
The event H is the consequence of transmitting the events
R and M through the "or" gate. The probability Prj can be
n
viewed as the result of transmitting P=: and P^-: through the
^ R M ^
"or" gate.
It must be emphasized that the probability analysis pre-
sented illustrates only the simplest cases. A probability
analysis on the AAW scenario medeled in this work will re-
quire some more difficult techniques.
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P- = 1 - p
H H
P- = 1 - P
R R
P- = 1 - PM M
^H = ^R ^ ^M
=
^R ^ ^M - ^^R ^ ^M^
= 1 - (1 - P^) (1 - P-)
^M
P^ V P^ = P^ + P2 - (Pi X P^)
= 1 - (1 - P. 1 - P2)
is the probabilistic "or" of
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